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 Context for the Report  
This report was prepared by students of Microeconomics of Competitiveness, joint course for 
Harvard Kennedy School and Harvard Business School students taught by Professor Michael 
Porter. This course is based on Professor Porter‟s competitiveness theory and extensively uses 
“Diamond” theory of economic development articulated in his book On Competition (Porter 
2008). Core principals of The “Diamond” theory reside on region/country/state/cluster‟s 
competitive position and are based on four pillars of competitiveness: factor conditions, demand 
conditions, related/supporting industries, and firm strategy, structure and rivalry. The main 
purpose of the Course was to cover a range of issues related to countries and clusters, all at 
differing stages of socioeconomic development, and analyze positive and negative efforts to 
upgrade competitive advantage. Our report is an effort to incorporate the lessons and to use the 
framework taught during the class using the case of Republic of Korea and shipbuilding cluster 
in Korea in particular. Unless otherwise stated, the views and recommendations expressed in this 
report are those of the authors, based upon the interpretation of raw data collected via interviews 
and other sources.  
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Korea‟s history is an example of discipline, hard work and constant effort to improve. With more 
than nine hundred invasions in two thousand years of recorded history, the country started the 
transformation of its economic system after Park Chung-hee took over the presidency, 
establishing new policies that built a new Korea at the end of the 20
th
 century. With Chaebols as 
the growth engines of an export oriented economy, Korea transformed from an agricultural 
nation to one of the most successful high-tech centers of the world, excelling by its state of the 
art technology and innovation. At first glance Korea‟s strategy seems to have paid off, with a 
GDP per capita around US$ 28,000, compared with only US$100 in 1963, however, the country 
is lagging behind its main competitors in several areas, including the efficiency of its labor 
market, the sophistication of its financial system and the development of its institutional 
framework. Although Korea‟s GDP per capita has significantly improved in the last 50 years, the 
country is still facing some of the traditional problems of medium developed nations. 
The Shipbuilding Cluster started with almost nothing in the 1950s with the exception of a proud 
heritage of having once being a successful oceanic nation in the 16
th
 century. Yet, in 2004, it 
emerged as the world‟s leading shipbuilding nation overtaking Japan and European nations who 
dominated the industry for centuries, a position it still holds on to precariously. Historically, the 
cluster benefitted from national investments in world class shipbuilding infrastructure, 
institutional capacity and specialized educational establishments, coupled with a relentless 
pursuit by shipbuilders and its suppliers to continuously enhance production efficiency. Its 
biggest challenge moving forward would be in stimulating domestic demand, realigning its 
research and development initiatives to support cluster objectives and a structured move away 
from „manufacturing‟ to a „services‟ focus strategy in the lower segment. 
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I. Country Analysis 
1. Country Background 
Located on the southern half of the Korean Peninsula in East Asia, the Republic of Korea 
(ROK), occupies an area of approximately 38,600 square miles, about the size of the U.S. state 
of Indiana, with more than 1,500 miles of coast line. The country is situated in a strategic 
neighborhood between China, Japan, and Russia, a location that has influenced its economic and 
political development. It has suffered nine hundred invasions, in two thousand years of recorded 
history, and five major periods of foreign occupation by China, the Mongols, Japan, and, after 
World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union (Jonsson, 1995). 
Figure1. Korea’s geographic position 
 
With a population that is expected to exceed 51 million people in 2010 (Chamberlain, 2010), 
Korea stands as the third most densely populated country in the world. Its aging population, 
declining birth rates and increasing per capita income, make its demographics more related 
OECD countries. Different philosophies have contributed to the development of Korea‟s 
pluralistic culture, but none has influenced it as deeply as Confucianism, shaping the central 





 century, Japan began its major expansion under the rule of Hideyoshi Toyotomi who 
attacked Korea as the first phase of the Chinese invasion (Oberdorfer, 1988). The Korean navy 
fought back with and early class of ironclad warships known as turtle ships, which inflicted 
severe losses on the Japanese. In the wake of the Japanese invasion Korea established a rigid 
policy of excluding foreigners, beginning an era of isolation that ended in the 19
th
 century when 
the US, Europe and Japan, sent warships forcibly to open the country to trade (Jonsson, 1995).  
In 1904 Japan and Russia engaged in war and after Japan‟s surprising victory, it occupied Korea 
in 1905 and annexed it as a Japanese possession in 1910. Japan then ruled as the harsh colonial 
master of the peninsula until its defeat in World War II, when the country came to be divided 
into two “temporary” zones of occupation. 
Korea, with its democratically elected government with Syngman Thee as President declared its 
independence as the Republic of Korea in August 1948. North Korea was incorporated into the 
totalitarian camp headed by the Soviet Union and established itself as the Democratic People‟s 
Republic of Korea (DPRK) in September 1948. Since then, Korea has lived under the threat of 
invasion, a factor that has determined its need to constantly improve its economic condition. 
2. ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 
During the 1950s after the attack of DPRK to reunify the Korean peninsula, Korea remained as a 
closed economy, implementing an import substitution model.  In 1953, at the end of the Korea 
War, the US and the ROK became treaty allies to deter foreign aggressions against the country. 
In 1961, Park Chung-hee took over the presidency, bringing military authority, discipline, and 
organization to the country and establishing new policies that powerfully shaped Korea for the 
rest of the 20
th
 century. President Park initiated the change from an agriculture based model to a 
model based on manufacturing, services, and a strong reliance on exports. He assumed an active 
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leadership in shaping the economic environment; implementing major reforms in a combination 
of state capitalism and five year economic plans. 
The government defined the companies –Chaebols– that would be the growth engines of the new 
export oriented economy and supplied them with policy incentives that included domestic market 
protection, capital trough policy loans, preferential interest rates, limits on labor unions, 
promotion of exports and barriers to imports. It also determined what kind of plants to build and 
what products to export, and restructured all industries to promote competition, though in some 
cases it was also eliminated.  
In 1961 the government established the Economic Planning Board leaded by the Prime Minister, 
with the objective to set specific export targets in each industry which if met would yield 
additional subsidized credits and access to growing domestic markets. From 1962 through 1996, 
Korea focused on the development of technology and skilled labor intensive industries (1970-
1981), the creation of technology intensive clusters (1982-1986); the development of human 
capital (1987-1991) and the specialization of high-tech industries (1992-1996). Korea‟s exports 
expanded from less than 5% of nominal GDP to around 30%, with steady improvements in 
technological sophistication (Chamberlain, 2010). Korea was able to accelerate its transition to a 
developed economy achieving an average economic growth of 6.9%. 
However, not everything going well and the economic and institutional model proved its 
weaknesses during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. During the 1970s oil crisis and high inflation 
affected Korea‟s exports and government‟s efforts to stabilize public finance resulted in 
recession, corporate failures and high unemployment. During the 1980s, economic crises 
continued and Korea was forced to accumulate US $46.8 billion of foreign debt which in 1985 
represented 56% of Korea's GNP (Bang, 2007). Korea became the world's fourth largest debtor 
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in terms of outstanding foreign debt, along with Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina. The Asian 
Financial crisis of 1997 forced the country to move towards a more liberal economic model, 
adopt a prudent fiscal and monetary policy and give full autonomy to the Central Bank in 1998
1
 
with mandate of price stability. Korea achieved an average budget surplus of 1.3% of GDP and 
an average inflation rate of 2.9% between 1999 and 2008 (EIU, 2010). 
3. RECENT ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
In 2008, Korean PPP-adjusted GDP per capita was US$ 28,000, compared with only US$100 in 
1963 (EIU report, 2010). Its total exports reached US$ 422 billion in 2008, 2.6% of total world 
exports and 6.5 times the level of 1990. However, the country is still lagging behind its main 
competitors with a GDP per capita 20% below Japan‟s, 21% below Germany‟s and 23% below 
Taiwan‟s, and there is an excessive concentration of growth with Seoul and adjacent cities 
generating nearly half of Korea‟s GDP (McKinsey Quarterly, 2010). The unemployment rate 
reached 3.18% in 2008, higher than the 2.46% achieved in 1980 (EIU report, 2010). 
Figure 2. Economic performance in Korea: drivers of economic growth 
 
 
Source: EIU, 2010 




























Between 1997 and 2007, Koreas‟ labor productivity grew at an average annual rate of 3.2% still 
lower Taiwan at 3.4% (EIU report, 2010). Despite its productivity growth Korea is still lagging 
behind its main competitors in absolute terms. Services industry was responsible for 56.2% of 
Korea‟s labor productivity growth in 1990s, but the ratio fell to 46.2% in 2000s, while the 
manufacturing sector contribution grew from 30.4% to 46.6%
2
. From 1990 to 2009, the GDP per 
person employed increased in 90.14%, reaching US $58,817, however, an hour worked in Korea 
produces on average 22.5% less output than an in Taiwan, 26% less than in Japan, 52% less than 
in Germany, and 55% less than in US (The Conference Board, 2010). 
Figure 3. Economic productivity and GDP per hour work index in Korea 
 
Source: OECD, labor statistics database  
Korea‟s macroeconomic performance has been positive. The government has maintained an 
average inflation rate of 2.99% in the last five years and a positive average current account 
balance of 1.42% between 2000 and 2008. As an example of its macro stability, the country 
achieved an historical level of international reserves, around US $255 billion in 2008 (EIU 
report, 2010). Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as a proportion of GDP reached only 11% in 
2008, the second lowest among OECD countries (EIU country data, 2010). 
 





Figure 4: Internal and external economic indicators for Korea, 1980-2009 








Source: EIU country data, 2010 
Korea‟s R & D spending of 3.2% of GDP is significantly above the OECD average of 2.2%, 
China (1.2%), Taiwan (2.4%) Germany (2.5%) and the US (2.6%), but still lower than Japan 
(3.4%) (OECD, 2010). In recognition of this, the government recently announced the decision to 
expand tax deductions for business investments in research and development.  




Korea‟s position with respect the number of patents per million people ranks 17th worldwide, 






) and Taiwan (6
th
). Universities only accounted 
for 2.3% of patents in 2003-2005, much lower than Singapore (10.2%). Combination of foreign 
ownership of domestic inventions and patents with foreign co-inventors in 2003-2005, is less 
than 10% of total patents, much lower than its main competitors (OECD, 2010). 
Finally, Korea performs well on the Human Development Index, ranking 26th on the last report, 
with particularly high scores for gross enrollment ranking 9
th
 (98.5%) and life expectancy at 
birth, ranking 25
th
. Under this scenario the current administration under the leadership of 
President Lee Myung-bak has set a new challenge, the “747 Plan”, consistent of achieving an 
annual growth of 7% of GDP, a $40k per capita income, and a rank of 7
th
 among the largest 
economies in the world. 
4. COMPOSITION OF THE ECONOMY 
Once being and agricultural nation, today agriculture represents only 2.6% of GDP, with industry 
(36.4%) and services (49.6%) leading the economy (EIU report, 2010). However, services 
remain weak employing only 66% of Korea‟s workforce in 2008, compared to 70% in Japan and 
85% in the US (Mckinsey Quarterly, 2010). 
Korea‟s existent clusters are the result of the policies implemented during the transformation 
period by both the public and private sector. By 2007 Korea‟s largest and most competitive 
clusters are the marine equipment cluster with an export value of US $27.5 billion, ranking 1
st
 in 
the world, communications equipment ($39.2) ranking 2
nd
; Transportation and Logistics ($33.8) 
ranking 5
th
; Information Technology ($52.5) ranking 6
th
, Metal Mining & Manufacturing ($29.2) 
ranking 13
th
; Automotive ($51.8) ranking 9
th






In the 1990s the government start implementing positive measures to encourage the promotion of 
SMEs, which today comprise 99.8% of all the Korean firms, 50% of manufacturing output, 80% 
of service sector output and 90% of total employment (Mckinsey Quarterly, 2010). However, the 
government has not reinvented its methods to promote economic growth and it is providing 
SMEs with subsidies, financial assistance, and tax incentives that contrary to enhance 
competition, diminish innovation, business sophistication, and efficiency.  
Figure 6. Korean export portfolio by Cluster, 1997-2007
 
Source: Institute for Strategy and Competitiveness, 2010. 
SMEs that are intimately related to Chaebols, either as subsidiaries or related companies in the 
industry seem to be more successful, reflecting that Chaebols, considered by the government as 
too big to fail, still control Korea‟s economic activity, accounting for 60% of total exports. 
5. ASSESSMENT OF THE NATIONAL BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 
Overall Korea ranked number 19
th
 in the Global Competitiveness Report 2009-2010, losing six 
places in only one year
3. Korea‟s primary strengths are on macroeconomic stability (11th), 
                                                 





), technological readiness (15
th




th). It remains as one of the world‟s innovation powerhouses (11th). 
Korea shows serious weaknesses in its labor market efficiency (84
th
), financial market 
sophistication (58
th
), and institutions (53
rd). The business community‟s discontent about the 
difficulty of hiring and firing employees (108
th
) is particularly pronounced and mirrored by 
Korea‟s low rank in the World Bank‟s Doing Business rigidity of employment index (92nd), and 
although a major labor law reform bill aimed at increasing flexibility, it has yet to be approved 
by the parliament (WEF, 2010).  
Despite the waves of consolidation and restructuring since 1997, banks are still very much seen 
as unsound (90
th
) and sophistication is low (WEF, 2010). For instance, capital raised through 
IPOs in 2008 was only 0.35% of GDP compared with Singapore‟s 1.01% of GDP (EIU, country 
finance, 2010). 
With respect of its institutional quality Korea ranks 53
rd
, reflecting a general dissatisfaction with 
the government, the trust in politicians (67
th
), the perceived opacity of policymaking (100
th
), and 
the burden of red tape (98
th
) (WEF, 2010). In addition, the governance analysis of Kaufmann & 
Kraay concludes that Korea is lagging behind its competitors in 5 out of 6 pillars evaluated; 
voice and accountability, political stability, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of 
corruption (Kaufmann & Kraay, 2009) 
4
. In the Corruption Perceptions Index 2008 Korea ranked 
40
th






), and Taiwan (39
th
), 
(Transparency International, 2010). Transparency International has expressed its concerns about 
the lack of autonomy of the Korean Independent Commission against Corruption, almost entirely 
appointed by the president.  
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 The country only passed in the Government effectiveness category. 
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Finally, there are some other strategic areas where Korea is lagging behind. Although it excels in 
its education parameters the quality of math and science education in Korea remains low, 
ranking 18
th




), and Hong Kong (11
th
). Korea is also lagging 
behind in its local availability of specialized research and training services (35
th





), Hong Kong (20
th
), and Japan (13
th) and in relative terms Korea‟s 






), and Germany (7
th
). In 
buyer‟s sophistication, which measures if buyers are making decisions based only on price or 
based on a sophisticated analysis of performance attributes, Korea ranks 15
th







), and Hong Kong (7
th
), (WEF, 2010). 
KOREA’S NATIONAL DIAMOND 
Factor Conditions: Korea has a highly developed infrastructure that facilitates market 
connectivity with high quality roads, port and air transport infrastructure. The quality of its 
electricity supply is among the top 20 in the world (CIA, 2010). Despite its low level of 
expenditure on educational institutions per student
5
, Korea has a high quality of primary and 
tertiary education, however, it has lagged behind in terms of specialized research and training to 
support business development. Moreover, although the country invests heavily in R&D, it seems 
to be strongly oriented to Chaebols, and no efforts to integrate inputs from different players 
exist, missing the opportunity to expand into other technological areas. 
Korea‟s health expenditure is very low, only 6.3% of GDP, the second lowest of 26 countries in 
OCED‟s database; and the number of doctors per a thousand people is only 1.7, ranked 39th of 60 
countries (EIU report, 2010). 
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Access to capital is a key driver to maintain its economic growth; however, Korea has major 
challenges to modernize its financial system, in particular to enhance the soundness of banks. 
Financial depth and savings are high
6
, the financial system remains unsophisticated and the 
availability of venture capital and private equity is very low (WEF, 2010). 
Figure 7. Korea’s National Diamond 
 
Demand conditions: The country has a large and demanding domestic market ranking 13
th
 in 
the world. The proportion of expenditure on sophisticated and manufacturing products and 
luxury services is high and electricity consumption per capita (kWh) is ranked 9
th
 in the world 
(CIA, 2010).  However, Chaebols are still the main driver of the domestic demand, with a 
limited participation of SMEs and especially the service sector. In addition, buyer‟s 
sophistication as an engine of upgrading and innovating is still low compared with Korea‟s main 
rivals. 
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 The ratio of total financial assets to GDP in 2009 is 5.3 times, ranked 23
rd
 of 60 countries in EIU database. The saving to GDP 
ratio has been maintained at 30% for a long time while the investment to GDP ratio is around 28% for the same time. 
+ Strong and interconnected clusters
+ Highly focused on productivity and efficiency 
+ Large number of local suppliers
- Good quality local suppliers but face 
difficulties to innovate at production level 
+ Large & demanding  domestic market  
+ Strong focus on  global customer needs
- Chaebols are main drivers of domestic demand
- Limited participation of SMEs
- Low buyer sophistication compared to 
competitors
+ Highly developed infrastructure
+ Strong domestic R&D (3.2% of GDP)
+ Quality of primary & tertiary education-2 Top 100 Univ.
- Low productivity compared with rivals
- Education and health expenditure below OECD average
- Low availability of  specialized research and training
- Weak financial system and unsophisticated
- High dependence on imported energy sources










+ High macroeconomic stability
+ High rivalry among large firms
+ High focus on innovation 
- Significant barriers to entry for  small companies 
- Labor market inflexibility and „high costs‟
- Red tape, opacity of policy making and corruption








Context for Firm Strategy and Rivalry: Although the country enjoys one of the most stable 
macroeconomic environments in the world, this is perhaps the weakest part of Korea‟s national 
diamond. While it has succeeded in promoting a highly competitive environment among 
Chaebols; entrance barriers for SMEs are still high; red tape, lack of accountability and 
corruption prevailing in the country has negatively affected FDI attraction, limiting Korean‟s 
ability to bring new skills, capabilities and technologies; improve local factor conditions; infuse 
modern ways of managing and competing, and in general stimulate cluster development. This 
situation exacerbates as Korea‟s labor market efficiency is still full of rigidity and expensive 
firing costs. 
Related and Supporting Industries: The developmental business policy implemented by the 
country resulted in multiple supporting industries around manufacturing, which enabled the 
country to build strong and interconnected clusters that complement each other- electronics, 
automotive, shipping, appliances & shipbuilding. Although most of these industries are highly 
focused on productivity and innovation it is difficult for suppliers to keep the pace and innovate. 
The high bargaining power of Chaebols has determined the role of the private sector since 
SME‟s competition is limited, and only those who are deeply connected to Chaebols seem to 
succeed as suppliers. SMEs‟ ability to compete in the industry is strongly determined by the 
strategies and goals of Chaebols. 
Cluster Policy: Korea does not currently have a national cluster policy. However in recognition 
to competitiveness‟ challenges, the President established in 2008 the Presidential Council on 
National Competitiveness (PCNC) consisting of members from government, business, and 
academia.  The PCNC holds meetings attended by the President on a monthly basis, in which he 
personally reviews the implementation status of the Council's agenda, allowing close and 
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continuous monitoring of task implementation. In January 2009, Korea formed the 47-member 
Presidential Council Nation Branding, a government initiative meant to coordinate all nation-
branding efforts. It includes 8 ministers, numerous business leaders, and professors. The council 
has embarked on a ten-point “Brand Korea” action plan. However, the strategy seems to be 
focused more on the promotion of the cultural side of Korea, rather on placing the key 
competitive advantages of the country. 
Other policies: Finally, the Lee Myung-bak administration is pushing for a broad environmental 
agenda geared towards sustainable development with a focus on clean renewable energy and 
environmentally friendly technology aimed not only to reduce the costs of production but also to 
combat climate change. Inaugurated in February 2009 the Presidential Committee on Green 
Growth, was designed to set economic and industrial policy directions in line with environmental 
preservation and sustainable development priorities. The committee promotes the creation of 
environment-friendly development and technology projects. 
President Lee Myung-bak‟s stated policy also favors deregulation. Like his predecessors, he is 
pushing for reforms through a myriad of committees set up under the top government officials. 
In May 2009 the Council on National Competitiveness short-listed 280 cases calling for respites 
or permanent improvements in regulatory enforcement, mainly in the areas of land and small-
business regulations. The government is implementing the plan to merge or sell part or all of the 
operations of 41 state enterprises, including two development banks, continue to deregulate 
financial sector and thinking about privatizing giant government enterprises like Korea Rail. 
5.1 INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLABORATION 
Korea has a number of IFCs. From 1970 to 2007, the government and the private sector have 
promoted the development of a number of research centers and business associations to promote 
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business collaboration across various industries. For instance, the Federation of Korean 
Industries; the Korea Plant Industries Association (KOPIA); the Korean International Trade 
Association (KITA), and the Korea & America Scientists & Engineers Association (KSEA).  
Another influential group that promotes cooperation at the international level is the Korea 
Foundation for International Cooperation of Science & Technology (KYCOS). 
6. KOREA-RECOMMENDATIONS 
Since the 1960s Korea has increased its per capita GDP more quickly than any of its neighbors 
but still lagging behind its main competitors. Korea‟s economy has relied heavily on the success 
of its manufacturing sector lead by Chaebols, missing the opportunity to exploit more its service 
potential.  
Our first recommendation for the country is to break the notion that economic growth only 
comes through Chaebols. Research by the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) has found that over 
the past 25 years, nearly 85% of GDP growth in high-income developed countries came from 
services. If Korea wants to enhance its economic growth in the following years, it has to place 
greater emphasis on its labor-intensive services sector. 
With respect the existing clusters, we believe that Korea will face greater competition from 
Taiwan, China and even Japan in the years ahead. We think that Korea‟s strategy must be to 
move higher up in the value chain. Capital investment and especially FDI will play a crucial role 
in that ascent. Korea must establish a new strategy to attract FDI to the country, ensuring 
property and intellectual rights, eliminating red tape and burocratic processes to investment, an 
fostering a true competition policy. FDI must be oriented to help Korea to exploit its true 




It is imperative for Korea to enhance its financial sector. It must work towards the consolidation 
of its banking sector, the development of new financial instruments and the increase of venture 
capital and private equity in business development; all of these without reducing the regulation 
of the system. 
Korea‟s competitive position in R&D is a key factor for the success of the country. The 
government and the private sector must embrace the notion that its future success will rely less 
on the production of physical things and more on intangibles such as knowledge and patents. 
Korea‟s decision to expand tax deductions for business investments in research and development 
must be oriented to target new growth areas based on its current competitive advantages, such as 
nanotechnology, green technologies, and biotechnology. Korea must create new venues to ensure 
the availability of local specialized research and training services to support business 
development and productivity growth. 
MGI has estimated that for Korea to reach Japan‟s current GDP per capita of $37,000 by 2020, it 
has to grow at around 5.6% per year. With an aging population and low birth rate, Korea will 
likely have slower growth in its workforce in the years ahead, which makes even more crucial 
for the country to focus on increasing its labor productivity. To sustain its economic growth 
Korea‟s Parliament has to move fast in approving and implementing the labor reform to reduce 
its labor rigidity, high hiring and firing costs. The new labor framework must mandate more 





1.SHIPBUILDING CLUSTER DEFINITION 
In this paper, the Shipbuilding Cluster encompasses firms involved in the design and 
construction of oceangoing ships measuring 5,000 GT
7
 and above, in South Korea. The key 
segments („Standard‟ and „High Value‟) and portfolio of products are illustrated in Figure 8.  
Figure 8 
 
While the actual shipbuilding actvity occurs in Korea‟s 7 Mega size and 8 Medium 
shipyards, the cluster depends on a variety of supporting and related industries that include 
steel fabrication, engine manufacturers plus a collection of specialized suppliers.   
2. EVOLUTION OF SHIPBUILDING CLUSTER IN SOUTH KOREA 
Korea‟s shipbuilding history can be traced to the 16th century but was inhibited by the self 
imposed period of isolation from 1637 until 1850,. The shipbuilding sector was revived with 
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 Gross Tonnage is the total internal volume of the vessel per definition adopted by the Korean Shipbuilder’s 
Association (KOSHIPA). In other parts of the document, data sourced from other external sources has been 
reported in CGT (ie. Compensated Gross Tonnage) comparative work content inherent in building the ship.. 
Container Ship Bulk Carrier 
 





Designed to carry dry 
cargo in bulk 
 
Oil Tanker Roll on/Roll off (Ro-Ro) 
 
Designed to carry crude oil 
in bulk.  
 
 
Designed to carry 
wheeled cargo such as 
automobiles or railroad 
cars. 
Chemical Tanker Ferry 
 
Designed to carry relatively 
small parcels of higher 
value chemicals, such as 
acids or polymers. 
 
Designed to carry 
primarily passengers, and 
sometimes vehicles and 
cargo. 
 
LNG Carrier Cruise Ship 
 
Designed to carry liquid 
natural gas at temperatures 
of around –160° C. 
   
Designed for holiday 
voyages, where the 
voyage itself and the 
ship's amenities are part 
of the experience.  
 
LPG Carrier Drillship 
 
A tank ship designed to 
carry liquefied propane or 




Vessel fitted with drilling 
apparatus. Used for 
exploratory offshore Oil 
& Gas drilling or 
scientific purposes  
 
‘Standard Ship’ 
‘High Value Ships’ 
II. Cluster Analysis 
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investments by Japanese companies in shipbuilding infrastructure during 1910-1945 
invasions. After independence in 1948, the Government established the Korea Shipbuilding 
and Engineering Corporation (KESC). The Government acted to allocate capital, expand 
facilities and facilitate imports of ship components.  
 The industry underwent significant growth since the early 70s as is illustrated in Figure 9 
which tracks production outputs against its main competitors. From 1948 to 1972, 
Government policy shifted from „Trade‟ to „Industrial‟ focus (per 1st and 2nd Economic Plan), 
and leveraged of the use of subsidies and import exemptions to stimulate the industry via 
selected Chaebols. Domestic demand was primarily for coastal cargo ships and fishery 





From 1970 to 1990, there industry focused on production efficiency and relied on imported 
foreign expertise. The establishment of the national steel manufacturer, POSCO and its 
relentless pursuit on production innovations against a backdrop of protectionism would 
evolve as a critical success factor. Focus on Research and Development (R&D) activities was 
stepped up with institutions like Korea Advanced Institute of Science & Technology 
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(KAIST) in 1971 and increased collaboration between academia and industry via institutions 
such as Pohang University of Science & Technology (POSTECH) (1986).  Chaebols started 
to embark on a series of strategic expansion activities – for example backward integration 
into ship engine suppliers and, in some case upstream into the maritime industry.  
Since the 1990, the cluster started to benefit from agglomeration effects arising from a strong 
base of related and supporting industries, intense rivalry for global market share and R&D 
collaboration facilitated by industry associations. They also benefitted from a continuous 
supply of specialized engineering and vocational graduates. While the overall economy was 
affected during the 1998 Asian crisis, Korea‟s shipbuilding companies benefitted from the 
weakening Won recovered fairly fast (Figure 9).  As the cluster is seeking to focus on 
moving up the value chain, the emergence of lower cost producing countries, particularly 
China is threatening their market share in the Standard Ship category.  
3. CLUSTER PERFORMANCE & RELATIVE POSITIONING 
South Korea is currently the leading shipbuilder in terms of production volume and sales as 
is illustrated in Figure D. South Korea‟s „Big 3‟ producers, Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI), 
Samsung Heavy Industries (SHI) and Daewoo Shipbuilding (DSB) currently dominate the 
global market in terms of output. In production terms, South Korea‟s output has increased by 
63% between 1975 and 2008, and currently stands at 41% market share in terms of 
production value and 33% in terms of market value. At USD43.1 billion, the shipbuilding 
industry ranked first among Korean exports in 2008 for the first time in history, outpacing 
automobiles and semiconductors. 
In terms of market value (Figure 10), South Korea illustrates a proportionately lower return 
on production then some of its competitors, in particular the EU countries. This is attributable 
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to their high reliance on lower end products (ie. Standard Ships) as opposed to the „High 










Market Share – Volume (CGT) 





The cruise ship product for instance (which is still dominated by EU countries) only accounts 
from 2% of production output but accounts for 20% of market value.
11
 Despite its significant 
advancements in shipbuilding technology, South Korea has had some difficulties in breaking 
into the „High Value Ship‟ segment as it faces intense competition in the Standard Ship 
segment (See Figure 12).  
Korea‟s shipbuilders are stepping up efforts on the High Value ship segment, with STX 
Offshore & Shipbuilding (STX) acquiring a stake in Aker Yards (of Norway) to penetrate 
this segment, while SHI has already announced plans to develop cruise ships. 
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 Source : Institute for Strategy & Competitiveness 
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 Source: Team analysis of data from Community of European Shipyards Association(CESA), KOSHIPA and 
ShipbuildingHistory.com 
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Price competitiveness declining as labor 
costs increase and the strengthening of 
the Won, particularly from 2001 to 2007 
(Figure 13). Tthe value of a 1000GT of 
South Korea‟s new  ship order was $1.5 
million (2000) but in 2008 it had 







Productivity levels still holding up though wages have been on the upward trend, and South 
Korea appears to be still ahead of its competitors except China (see Figure 19, post) 
Production Efficiency Not Innovation The industry has been driven by a relentless pursuit 
to outperform the „productivity frontier‟15 to enhance operational efficiency. Highlights in 
2008 include HHI‟s „T-Shaped dock‟ that enabled the simultaneous production of 2 ships and 
SHI‟s 70% production automation rate. In parallel, there has been a focus on continuous 
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innovation to enhance its product portfolio highlights of which in 2009 includes the  
production of the world‟s first multidirectional oil tanker and securing its first order for the 
first cruise ship to be built in Asia by Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME). 
However as highlighted in country analysis (Figure 5 ante), in terms of innovation as 
measured by patents, they still lag most of their shipbuilding competitor nations, with the 
exception of China.  
4. CLUSTER LOCATION & CLUSTER MAP  
Figure 1416 - Cluster Location 
 
South Korea‟s shipbuilding cluster is 
located in the region of Gyeongnam 
(Figure 14). Facilities of South Korea‟s 
shipyards are located primarily in the 
Ulsan, Busan and Geoje districts.  The 
deep waters and the lack of sandbanks 
made these districts natural choices for 
construction of shipyards. Its proximity 
to other heavy industries would over 
time contribute to agglomeration effects 
that the cluster benefitted from. 
 
CLUSTER MAP (Figure 15) 
 
Government The Special Maritime Administration Committee, chaired by the President himself 
and a dedicated Ministry of Maritime Affairs continue to support the cluster in light of its 
significant role to the economy.  
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Figure 15 -South Korea’s Marine Cluster Map 
 
Related Industries (Upstream) The steel industry plays a key role in raw material supply to the 
shipbuilding industry and its specialized suppliers. There are 10 major players in Korea, with 
POSCO accounting for roughly 60% of output). South Korea ranks as the 6
th
 largest global 
supplier (53.6 million tons in 2008)
17
 and is highly regarded for innovations in production cost 
efficiency
18
. The cluster is also supported by a large ecosystem of specialized suppliers 
producing shipbuilding related components (Hull, Engine, Machinery and Electronics 
components) as well as Outfitting services. These 153 plus companies employ about 69,000 
employees, with total revenues in 2003 of $3.6 billion
19
. 
Related Clusters  The steel industry has been a catalyst for a number  of  other  industries and in  
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the last 30 years, these industries have complemented each other in a virtuous cycle. Korea‟s 
automotive sector is currently fourth largest in the world in terms of production capacity
20
, with 
Hyundai Motor Corp. as the leading player. Samsung is the largest Electronics company in the 
world, while LG has emerged as the3
rd
 largest cell phone maker in the world. The growth of its 
software and communications sector is expected to contribute to the increasing trend of 
digitalization in the shipbuilding sector
21
. These industries have also stimulated demand for 
automation technologies, benefitting shipbuilders like SHI where automation levels have reached 
70% in 2008.  
Related Industries (Downstream) Activities South Korea‟s maritime sector is a key end user of 
commercial ships for import of raw materials (in particular energy sources) and for export of its 
manufactured goods. Hanjin Shipping is Korea‟s largest carrier operating 200 vessels that 
transports in excess of 100 million tons cargo annually and 2008 revenues of $7.7billion. South 
Korea‟s ports play a key role in the economy, supporting international trade and logistics. Busan 
the county‟s largest seaport handles container traffic amounting to over 240 million tons22, 
making it the world‟s 5th largest port. South Korea completely depends on imports for oil 
consumption, and re-exports about a quarter of its gross oil imports as refined petroleum 
products, mostly to neighboring countries. In 2006, South Korea was the 9th-largest consumer of 
oil and the 5th-largest net importer of oil. The refining and retail sectors are dominated by 
several large Chaebols, with SK Corporation holding the largest market share. The Chemical 
industry accounted for 17.9% of South Korea‟s GDP (2008), with approximately 150,000 plus 
employees and 2007 revenues of $152.3billion. Leading companies in the sector are LG Chem 
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and Samsung Total Petrochemicals.  The tourism sector
23
 utilizes the ferry boat products 
produced by the cluster for purposes of domestic travel for mainland to island routes.  
Educational Institutions Several key educational and research institution supporting the cluster 
including the Korea Maritime University (Busan) and the Korea Marine Equipment Research 
Institute (KOMERI) are located within the Gyeongnam region itself. The cluster also benefits 
from supply of Engineers from Seoul National University and Korea Advanced Institute of 
Science & Technology, KAIST, as well as skilled workers from vocational institutions such 
Ulsan Polytechnic College and Changwon Polytechnic College.  
5. INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLABORATIONS (IFC) 
Key IFCs supporting the shipbuilding cluster are illustrated Figure in 16. KOSHIPA is the 
leading shipbuilding association enhancing cooperation amongst members and promoting their 
common interests, with membership covering all major shipbuilders. Other key shipbuilding 
industry associations include Korea Marine Equipment Association (KOMEA) and the Korea 
Shipbuilding Industry Cooperative (KOSIC).  
Figure 16 
  
A host of specialized institutions such as the Korea Marine Equipment Research Institute 
(KOMERI) and the Society of Naval Architects of Korea (SNAK) are more focused on R&D 
activities and production innovation.  The Government‟s strong push to promote University-
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Industry R&D activities in the 80s resulted in many collaborative initiatives,  though  outputs  in  
terms  of  innovation have not been very encouraging. More recently the Ministry of Knowledge 
Economy,   has been pushing for the convergence of shipbuilding and IT sectors to support the 
“Smart Ships” agenda.24   
6. CLUSTER DIAMOND 
Shipbuilding diamond analysis is illustrated in Figure 17 with a summary of competitive 
advantages and challenges for the cluster. 
Figure 17 
 
Factor Conditions The cluster benefits from strong physical infrastructure in terms of modern 
shipyard facilities plus highly developed transportation logistics and communications 
infrastructure. Since the 1980s, the cluster has benefitted from agglomerations effects arising 
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+ Strong rivalry drive by Government‟s incentive 
policies
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(post ‟98 crisis) ?
- Barriers to entry for new shipbuilders
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 Deep waters and lack of sandbanks suited for shipbuilding facilities
 As an oceanic nation located at the ‘global trunk route’, including the North American route, the Southeast 
Asian route and the European route
 Suitable climate for shipbuilding all year round and ice free .
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from the development of industrial parks for collocation with suppliers and sub-contractors, and 
from a continuous supply of specialized resources from Universities & Vocational institutions 
with dedicated shipbuilding technology faculties. Wages have been on the upward trend (Figure 
18), its productivity data is still ahead of its competitors at $159 per CGT as illustrated in Figure 
19, though there are some concerns about its labor market rankings. The Unions movement in is 
regarded as very influential and in some circles as being almost „militant‟ towards management.  
While overall R& D spending at a country level has been increasing, R&D spending for the 
shipbuilding industry declined to just about 1% of total sale for the Big 3, which is lower than 
the average for Korea‟s 538 listed companies (2.36%) or Samsung Electronics (9.4%)25. 
University-Industry collaborations have also declined, which is likely to be attributable with the 
liberalization of the late 80s and skewing of institutional incentives to functionally specific 
goals
26
. On the Industry side, evidence suggests that it does not necessarily share much of its 
R&D capabilities with academic and government entities, while the production of high quality 
outputs and patents still lag behind that of developed nations (Figure 5, ante).  
Related & Supporting Industries.  Production efficiency and competitive prices from domestic 
steel suppliers, has been reinforced by sophisticated demand from related clusters. In 2009 
however, Korea‟s imports of steel from China increased by 45.9%27, which is quite alarming if 
this trend were to continue. Additionally, the strong network of specialized suppliers and sub-
contracting resources are also a key asset though most of the successful suppliers are subsidiaries 
of the Chaebols (eg. Hyundai Heavy Machinery, the supplier of ship engines). South Korea‟s 
shipbuilders are facing problems in sourcing for components for Value Add ships, in particular 
cruise and scientific ships  which is somewhat connected to the issue of weak domestic demand.  
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Demand Conditions. Demand for the cluster‟s products from the domestic markets (1989 to 
2008) is very small (3.6%) when compared to its export market (96.4%)
30
. The high demand
31
for 
LNG carriers (in the mid to late 80s) to support its domestic energy needs was a key driver in 
becoming a market leader. Weak domestic demand sophistication for niche product like Cruise 
Ships will be a key issue for the industry as it seeks to transitions to the „High Value Ship‟ 
segment. New sources of domestic demand are however emerging from the energy sector, in 
particular „Extreme Ocean‟ products such as tidal power plants and off-shore wind turbines. 
Context for Firm Strategy & Rivalry The cluster is characterized by strong rivalry between 
shipbuilders driven by government‟s historical incentive based policies. Government support has 
however always been understood to be conditional upon „performance‟ and they have withdrawn 
support whenever performance has lagged
32
. Despite this strong rivalry, shipbuilder cooperate 
closely in 2 areas, with the first being in promoting common interests against external groups, as 
they did in EU deliberations on allegations of „anti-competitive‟ behavior. The second is via an 
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informal network of Engineers from the largest shipbuilding companies who meet biannually to 
exchange technological information and in solving common problems
33
.  The cluster is however 
regarded as having high barriers to entry for new players, especially those that are seeking to 
move up the value chain, which is commonly attributed to the traditional stronghold by Chaebols 
on capital intensive industries like shipbuilding. In addition the cluster is also characterized by a 
high degree of red tape and bureaucracy as we saw from recent decision by STX Shipbuilding‟s 
to relocate its facilities to Dalian, China and Hanjin Shipbuilding‟s decision to move to a new 
facility at Subic Bay, Philippines.
34
 Until very recently the Gyeongnam provincial government‟s 
role in the development of the shipbuilding cluster has been minimal, as the industry was 
perceived to be in the domain of the central Government and Chaebols. They therefore did not 
see it as being their role to develop the cluster. 
7. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE SHIPBUILDING CLUSTER 
Shift market focus and strategy Korea‟s position in the Standard Ship segment is not 
sustainable in light of the intense competition from China and other „lower costs‟ new entrants 
(ie. Vietnam, Philippines and India). We are proposing a fundamental strategic shift from 
‘manufacturing’ to ‘services’ based operations in this segment, and the relocation of its 
„Standard Ship‟ product line as its traditional competitive advantages has been nullified35. In 
light of improving bilateral relations with China, Korean shipbuilders should take advantage of 
the „equity for technology‟ FDI incentives in China to increase strategic alliances with their 
shipbuilders.  DSME, STX and SHI have already started making direct „Greenfield‟ investment 
to operate Chinese hull block manufacturing sites
36
 but the industry needs to start looking at a 
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broader and more structured initiative. Additionally this would negate the increasing trends of 
steel imports from China since the shipbuilders would be closer to raw material sources. 
Stimulate domestic demand for ‘Value Add’ products After years of attempts to break into 
the Cruise ship market, DSME has finally secured its first order. Yet, despite 7.9 million inbound 
tourist and 11.9 million outbound tourists in 2009
37
, to date there are no local Korean cruise ship 
operators. With majority of inbound tourist coming from Japan, China and United States
38
 and its 
strategic location in the East Asian region coupled with the abundance of tourist attractions 
(including several world heritage sites), we believe there is significant potential to develop the 
domestic cruise ship tourism segment to stimulate domestic inbound tourism. This proposal 
would require cross functional inputs from other parts of Government and could help to stimulate 
demand for cruise ships. Korea‟s high reliance on imported energy sources also build a 
compelling case for it to pioneer extreme ocean technology segment, in particular tidal power 
plants (currently being pioneered by Hyundai Samho Heavy Industries
39
); off-shore wind 
turbines and carbon capture storage technologies. This would be a logical move up the value 
chain based on its established strengths across the maritime value chain segment. While there 
have been some company specific initiatives, this proposal would be best facilitated and 
coordinated under the Ministry of Knowledge Economy‟s “Brain Korea 21” initiative.  
Strong steering organization for coordinating R&D programs across institutional and 
disciplinary boundaries. In comparing the Japanese and Korean R&D accomplishments, it has 
been concluded
40
 that Korea‟s protective industrial policies encouraged the duplication of 
technological capabilities amongst major Chaebols, with a resulting failure to promote joint 
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R&D activities, primarily due to the organizational and institutional structure. Research policy 
should less based on strict quantitative performance measures but rather ” a balanced approach 
between bibliometric indices and the informed judgment of peers with expertise and academic 
maturity”41. While strong government control is neither desirable nor required, there is a need for 
the Government to facilitate the reformulation of research evaluation policies at a national and 
regional level to stimulate inter-organizational R&D activities that span institutional and 
disciplinary borders in areas such as the „Green Ship‟ segment.  
Decentralize cluster development role to the provincial government of Gyeongnam The cluster 
literature on the role of local governments to drive cluster development
42
 is especially relevant in 
the case of South Korea‟s shipbuilding cluster. The developed status of Korea‟s provincial 
governments and its proximity to the cluster participants and the challenges they face, warrants a 
decentralization of the central government‟s role in driving the shipbuilding cluster. While the 
central government needs to adopt certain minimum standards (particularly in streamlining R&D 
policies at a national), provincial government of Gyeongnam can play a far more effective role in 
choosing public investment choices and driving implementation. For this cluster in particular, we 
see the potential for the provincial government to play a more significant role in reducing red 
tape inherent in government approvals, stimulating the participation of a local SME networks 
and attracting more national R&D establishments and professional associations located outside 
the cluster (particularly in Seoul and Daejeon
43
) to relocate. The local government can also 
serves as a more effective a facilitator for company engagement with local union leaders, in 
reshaping a collective local work identity based on the founding values of the cluster. 
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